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ARE CITY MANAGERS
GREEDY BUREAUCRATS?
JOHN R. BARTLE
University of Nebraska at Omaha
RONNIE LaCOURSE KOROSEC
North Carolina State University
INTRODUCTION
William A. Niskanen's (1971, 1975) theory of bureaucracy has
been a source of much debate and research.^ The theory assumes
that utility-maximizing bureaucrats will seek to maximize their
agency's discretionary budget. A central implication of this theory is
that bureaus will supply output inefficiently or in quantities greater
than that desired by citizens.
The authors test Niskanen's hypothesis by examining the decision
of cities to contract out for services. Their premise is that city
managers fit the characteristics of the greedy bureaucrat Niskanen
describes. If his theory is valid, then city managers should be expected to avoid contracting out because it would expose their discretionary budget and make it more difficult to use for their own purposes.
At odds with Niskanen's theory in this case is the municipal
reform literature that argues that professionalism in city management will seek to perform services in the "best" or most efficient way,
presumably, a manner in which the discretionary budget is minimal
or zero. In this case, the authors might expect to observe contracting
out in professionally managed cities. These opposing hypotheses
thus allow for a test of two competing theories of bureaucracy.
Contracting out is one form of privatization. Privatization increases the service production and delivery options available to
government managers. Contracting out may enhance cost-efficiency
and service quality (Kettl, 1988) or it may lead to cost overruns,
shoddy workmanship, and corruption (Hanrahan, 1983). While there
has been much debate about the merits of contracting out, there is
little evidence about the propensity of different cities to contract out
for services. In this article, the authors examine the difference in
contracting out between city manager cities and cities with other
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forms of governance.

THE GREEDY BUREAUCRAT HYPOTHESIS
Niskanen derives a model that assumes the bureaucrats maximize utility based on their income and their perquisites. These, in
turn, are based on a bureau's output and its discretionary budget.
Niskanen (1975: 618-619) defines discretionary budget as "the difference between [the bureaucrat's] total budget and the minimum cost
of producing the expected output." It is not the total agency budget.
In the first case, where it is assumed that utility is totally based on
the discretionary budget, the result is that the bureau will produce
the optimal output inefficiently. In the second case, where utility is
based only on output, the bureau will produce output at twice the
optimal level but will provide it at the efficient cost. More recently,
Niskanen (1991) argued that the behavioral assumption should be
changed to assume that bureaucrats act to maximize only their discretionary budget.
Other empirical tests have focused on various results of the
model-that output will be oversupplied or that it will be provided at
too high a cost. This research focuses on the role of the discretionary
budget in the bureaucrat's utility function. If the discretionary budget
is important to the bureaucrat, then it is expected that he/she will do
what he/she can to obfuscate the size of the discretionary budget.
Specifically, here the assertion is that bureaucrats who follow Niskanen's model will not wish to establish contracts for services.
In these cases, the total cost of the output is easily observable (in
the amount of payment to the firm or other government) and hence,
in the discretionary budget, the amount remaining after these costs
will also be observable. Exposing this amount to the scrutiny of the
bureaucrat's political sponsor will defeat the bureaucrat's objectives
in this model and thus his behavior that would not be expected.
Therefore, contracting out for serviced will expose the discretionary
budget to public scrutiny while providing the service in-house with
city employees and resources will not. While the discretionary
budget is the motivating factor for the bureaucrat's behavior, the
observable activity is the propensity to contract out which is the
dependent variable in the model developed here.
Niskanen specifically recommends greater use of private or nonprofit agents to provide services as one alternative. Niskanen
(1975:637-638) writes, "Inefficiency is not necessarily a characteristic
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of the supply of government services. For a given output... costs can
be reduced by contracting with private firms, by reducing the size of
bureaus, and by increasing the competition among bureaus."
The next question then is, in the context of local government,
who is expected to be a greedy bureaucrat? That is, which type of
officials would be expected to behave in this manner. Niskanen
speaks specifically about the greedy bureaucrat as one who is an
administrative appointee with a political sponsor. The bureaucrat
has enough power over information to operate as a monopolist who
presents the less-informed sponsor a budget and output combination.
While these characteristics may describe many types of bureaucrats at the local government level, they certainly describe city
managers. These managers are professionally trained and often work
with city councils (political sponsors) who are part-time and often
not trained in technical matters involved in producing local public
goods. City managers have been found to be politically influential in
part because "of their ability to control critical information in the
local political system" (Henry, 1987:305). In other forms of city
government, elected officials and employees may have relationships
that are similar to that described by Niskanen but, generally speaking, the elected official does more direct supervision of employees
on a full-time basis, making the hypothesized behavior less likely.
Niskanen specifically discusses local government bureaucratic
behavior. Conscious of residents' ability to "vote with their feet" m
certain metropolitan areas, he argues that, because the cost for
residents to move among local governments is much lower than
moving among states or nations, the elasticity of demand for local
goods will be higher and therefore "... the combination of services
will be responsive to the preferences of residents and that the services will be supplied at near the minimum cost" (Niskanen,
1971:155).
If so, then the greedy bureaucratic behavior will be less likely
among local goverrunents where the costs of moving are lower. This
describes cities in metropolitan areas with numerous municipalities,
little racial discrimination in housing, and littlefiscalzoning. However, in rural areas there are significantly higher costs to moving and
thus the hypothesis would predict greater presence of greedy bureaucratic behavior in these cities, all things being equal.
Niskanen's model is simple. This is the virtue of a theory if that
theory applies generally. Whether it applies to city managers is the

(92)

PAQ SPRING 1996

question here. City memagers may well be motivated by other factors
besides bureau output and their discretionary budget. Some of these
factors may appeal to personal or "greedy" motives and others may
be more altruistic. Because of the limitations of the econometric test
performed, only two theories are tested. This article tests Niskanen's
model against an alternative hypothesis from the municipal reform
literature. It does not present evidence on the motives of city
managers.
Dunleavy (1991:210) has written:
Over time, the appeal of the budget-maximizing view seems to have
grown apace so that economists, conservative politicians and media
commentators now cite it routinely, as an uncontentious part of the
conventional wisdom. Yet this view has rarely been subjected to critical
attention or systematic empirical testing. Even when relevant evidence
has been collected, the budget-maximizing model has almost never been
tested comparatively to see how it performs vis-a-vis rival approaches in
analyzing empirical phenomena.

The authors seek to fill this gap in the research by explicitly testing
this theory in comparison to a rival hypothesis.
To simimarize then, the form of the greedy bureaucrat hypothesis that the authors test here is that city managers, especially in rural
areas, will seek to maximize their discretionary budget and in so
doing will attempt to avoid contracting out for the delivery of public
goods and services.
PROFESSIONALISM IN GOVERNMENT HYPOTHESIS
An alternative hypothesis to Niskanen's theory can be derived
from the municipal reform literature. This literature argues that
public officials have the power to exercise their discretion in influencing public opinion and building support for programs they favor.
However, rather than seeing bureaucrats as self-serving, this literature argues that there is "a correspondence between the decision of
bureaucrats and the preferences of the community" (Rourke,
1969:3). Carl Friedrich (1972) and Frederick Mosher (1968) have
each argued that municipal reform that attempts to strengthen
professionalism among public officials will help form the proper set
of values among city officials.
The municipal reform literature stresses that bureaucrats should
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ignore self-interested alternatives in favor of serving the larger
public interest. It relies on the concept of democratic responsibility.
Denhardt and Hammond (1992:25), citing Marshall Dimock, Paul
Appleby, and Steven Bailey, argue that public officials need to have
certain qualities among them loyalty, honesty, courage, fairness,
charity, and "a special attribute of public responsibility."
Research more specific to city management fits this perspective.
Protasel (1988) points out that many city managers and the International City Management Association (ICMA) itself see the role of a
city manager as providing professional leadership rather than acting
as a neutral administrator. Svara (1990:175) describes the style of a
"responsible professional" in city management as "providing professional leadership without independent political power resources, on
the one hand, or political dependency on all elected officials, on the
other."
In the language of this article, this literature would argue that it
is the city manager's responsibility to discover and adopt the
community's "true" utility function (which may or may not be perceived by the commimity) as his/her own in his/her professional life.
We certainly would not expect these managers to behave like greedy
bureaucrats in the Niskanen model; instead, we would expect them
to minimize rather than maximize their discretionary budget to get
more services for the tax dollar. Therefore, the hypothesis is that
professional city managers are more likely to contract out if in fact
there are systematic savings to be made or there will be no difference if there is no advantage to contracting out.
DATA
The data used here are drawn from a 1988 survey of alternative
service delivery approaches collected by the ICMA. The survey
includes responses from 1,313 cities profiling eight alternative service delivery approaches: contracting with a private firm, contracting
with another government, franchises, subsidies, vouchers, volunteers,
"self-help," and regulatory or tax incentives. This study focused only
on city contracting with private firms and other governments.
Complete information is available for 1,173 cities.
There are five forms of goverrmient represented in the data set:
mayor-council, city manager, commission, town meeting, and representative town meeting. The city manager type was taken as the
"professionally managed" form of government. While some of the
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other forms have certain degrees of professionalism, the key distinction is that these forms of government are less likely to have the
independence, professional ethic, and socialization that city managers have.
Examining the incidence of contracting by these cities is instructive. Overall, 89.6 percent of these cities contract with a private firm
for one or more services while 79.8 percent contract with another
government for services. City manager cities contract out slightly
more frequently than the average; 90.6 of these cities contract with a
private firm for one or more services and 81.6 percent with another
government. The difference between the two subsets is not significant in the first case but is significant in the second case. For all
cities the mean percenti^e of the 66 service areas that are contracted with a private firm is 21.1 percent and 14.3 with another government. For city manager cities these figures are 22.0 percent and 14.2
percent, respectively. The difference between the two subsets is
statistically significant in the first case but not in the second case.
Thus, most of these cities contract out with both public and private agents, more often with private firms. City manager cities are
slightly more likely to contract out. This general pattern of contracting out is more in line with the professionalism in government
hypothesis than the greedy bureaucrat hypothesis.
MODEL
The model for this study is drawn from one developed by Korosec (1993). That comprehensive model explains the decision of cities
to contract out with a private firm. The relevant literature on contracting out suggested five categories of variables which affect the
decision to contract out: legal, political, economic, organizational,
and demographic. Korosec found that economic and demographic
variables were the most important factors explaining variation in the
decision to contract out with private firms.
The variables used in this analysis were taken from the survey
responses. Ouestions about the reasons why each city did or did not
contract out were asked for each service delivery area. Most of the
questions were "yes/no" questions, therefore many of the variables
used here axe. dichotomous.
As mentioned, this study examines both contracting with private
firms as weU as local governments. The focus here is on the difference in contracting here between professionally managed cities and
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others. The dependent variable, CONTRACT, represents the percentage of the service areas arranged by the city that involves contracting out with private firms or other local governments. As discussed above, this is the behavior that can be observed that allows
researchers to test the competing hypotheses.
The central independent variable of interest, MANAG, indicates
whether the city is a professionally managed form of government. If
the greedy bureaucrat hypothesis is supported, then the coefficient
for this variable should be negative, indicating that, all other things
being equal, professionally managed cities contract out less than
other cities. If the professionalism in government hypothesis is
correct then this coefficient will be either zero or positive.
To create a more fully specified model, several other independent variables were drawn from the Korosec's model. Two dummy
variables, SUBURB and URBAN, indicate the metropolitan location of the government. The other cities are in rural areas; no
dummy variable is included for these cities to avoid singularity. It is
expected that SUBURB and URBAN will have a positive influence
on the propensity to contract out because of the greater number of
potential contractors and their customers in metropolitan areas.
These variables act as a measure of the availability of actual and
potential service suppliers. The variable POP is the population of the
city in 1980. It is expected to have a positive influence on contracting
out because larger areas should have larger markets of contractors
and thus more competitive contracting prices.
Several economic and organizational variables are relevant to
explaining contracting out. The variable COST indicates that contracting out was, in part, pursued in response to internal pressures to
decrease the cost of service delivery. The authors expect that this
variable will have a positive influence on the dependent variable. The
variable NUMBER indicates that the government perceived an
insufficient number of competent private deliverers. This variable
should have a negative influence on the propensity to contract out.
MONITOR indicates that the government systematically monitors contracting. It is expected to have a positive influence on
CONTRACT because through monitoring these cities can reduce
the uncertainty of their agreement. The variable EXPEREN indicates that the government perceived either institutional rigidities or
a lack of precedent to contracting out. This variable was expected to
have a negative influence. CONFIDEN indicates that the government perceived a lack of evidence on the effectiveness of private
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alternatives and its impact is expected to be negative. FISCAL indicates that externalfiscalpressures spurred the government's decision
to contract out and its expected impact is positive. All of these variables are dummy variables.
Two political variables and a set of legal variables are included in
the analysis. The variable CITIZEN indicates that opposition from
citizens was perceived to be a potential obstacle to contracting out. It
is expected to have a negative influence on the dependent variable.
The variable LABOR indicates that the government perceived that
restrictive labor agreements are a potential obstacle to contracting
out. This variable should have a negative influence on contracting
out. The perceived presence of legal constraints on contracting out is
measured by LEGAL which is expected to have a negative coefficient.
Again, all of these are dummy variables. Also, 46 dummy variables for states are included to reflect variation among states in laws
governing contracting out. A state may either mandate, allow or
prohibit contracting out in various instances. While data are not
available on the scope of these laws, the dummy variables for states
will, in part, reflect this variation.
RESULTS
To estimate the impact professionalism has on contracting out,
the variable MANAG is included in the equation and tested for
statistical significance. Later the data are broken into two subsets to
examine the differences between the subsets.
Initial testing of this model indicated the presence of heteroskedasticity. This result was adjusted using a weighted least squares
approach. Table 1 presents the results of this adjusted model. It
indicates that the coefficient for the dummy variable for city manager cities is negative but not significant at the 95 percent confidence
level. This then does not support the Niskanen hypothesis, rather it
is consistent with the professionalism in government hypothesis.
Certain of the other variables performed as predicted. Among
the demographic variables, both URBAN and SUBURB were significant and positive as predicted. POP was positive but not significant.
These results are generally consistent with the hypothesis that
market access affects contracting out. The economic and organizational variables gave mixed results. COST was significant and positive as predicted and indicates that perceived cost savings leads to
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TABLE 1
REGRESSION MODEL OF CITY
CONTRACTING OUT

Dependent Variable: CONTRACT
Independent
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

MANAG
POP (in millions)
URBAN
SUBURB
COST
NUMBER
MONITOR
EXPEREN
CONEIDEN
FISCAL
CITIZEN
LABOR
LEGAL

-0.076
14.948
6.814**
15.190**
2.815*
2.461
4.557**
1.805
0.403
2.285
8.061*
-0.978
1.496

1.374
7.940
1.790
1.254
1.289
1.412
1.166
1.508
1.392
1.253
3.201
1.587
1.630

N=984
R-squared=.8177
Adjusted R-squared= .8061
F=70.345
Note: 46 dummy variables for states are not listed
here. The intercept was removed because of these
dummy variables.
* Significant at 95% level
** Significant at 99% level

(98)

PAQ SPRING 1996

contracting. The variable MONITOR was also significant and positive as predicted, consistent with the hypothesis that contracting out
is more likely when there is an ability to monitor the contract.
NUMBER, EXPEREN, CONFIDEN, and FISCAL were not significant. The political variables did not perform as predicted. LABOR
was not significant and CITIZEN was significant but positive rather
than the anticipated negative sign. For the legal variable, the variable
LEGAL was not significant; however, all but two of the state-specific
dummy variables were significant. This indicates an important part
of the variation in CONTRACT was coming from differences unique
to the states, some of which may be attributable to the legal environment.
Separate regressions were also run for rural, suburban, and
urban cities. In all three cases the coefficient for the city manager
dummy variable was not significant. In the suburban city equation it
was positive but not significant (t-statistic of 0.144). In the urban and
rural equations the coefficients were negative and also not significantly different from zero (t-statistics of -0.159 and -0.957, respectively). As discussed earlier, the manifestation of greedy bureaucratic
behavior might be repressed in urban and suburban areas where city
managers are forced to compete but this behavior should be present
in the more isolated rural areas where the city manager can behave
more as a monopolist. However, there is no evidence of this behavior.
Finally, the equations were also estimated in tow subsets, one for
city manager cities and the other for all others. An F-test to test for
structural differences between these two regressions did find a significant difference. The differences help shed further light on the earlier results. Comparing the city manager regression to the "other" city
regression, the variable MONITOR was larger and more significant
in the first, although it was significant in both, suggesting that city
managers place more emphasis on their ability to monitor a contract. The variable CITIZEN, positive and significant in the city
manager regression, is not significant in the other. Strictly speaking,
the interpretation is that citizen opposition stimulates city managers
to contract out. More generally, this may indicate that city managers
are more willing to go against public opinion to contract out than
other cities. Finally, the variable URBAN is not significant in the city
manager regression but is significant and positive in the other regression, indicating that, in city manager cities, market access is less
of an infiuence.
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The presence or absence of a city manager, by itself, does little to
explain variation in contracting out either in general or for rural
cities that have the best opportunity to behave as the greedy bureaucrat hypothesis predicts. However, city manager cities do behave
somewhat differently than other cities in ways that appear consistent
with the professionalism in government hypothesis. The results paint
a picture of a city manager who is more responsive to economic
forces than political and demographic forces, perhaps willing to
assert leadership when necessary. Therefore, the authors conclude
that the results are more consistent with the professionalism in government hypothesis and not with the greedy bureaucrat hypothesis.

CONCLUSION
This article has tested the proposition that the institutional
context within which city decision-makers operate may affect the
efficiency of their actions. An implication of Niskanen's theory is
that city managers would be more likely to avoid contracting out for
local services to hide their discretionary budget. None of the evidence presented here supports that proposition. Even the test of this
proposition for rural cities, which are most likely to be able to
behave as Niskanen predicts, does not find supportive evidence.
Rather, the evidence is consistent with the professionalism in government hypothesis, suggesting that city managers choose the most
efficient method of service delivery which may or may not involve
contracting out, depending on the specific circumstances. In their
decisions regarding contracting out, city managers appear to focus
less on political variables and more on economic forces.
Blais and Dion (1991:360) have written that "the proposition that
bureaucrats are all-powerful in their relationship with politicians
must be dismissed." Dunleavy (1991:247-248) has concluded that
"[t]he existing empirical support for budget-maximizing models is
scanty in the extreme ... [these models] clearly have considerable
difficulty in accounting for the emergence and strength of ... privatization and deinstitutionalization." Finally, Peters (1991:346) has
written that "the power of the bureaucracy apparently is exercised
differently, and perhaps for different purposes, than is assumed in
many of the rational choice approaches to bureaucracy."
Lack of empirical support for Niskanen's model poses the question of what is the appropriate alternative model. One possible starting point is a positive version of the professionalism in goverimient
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hypothesis in which the utility function of the bureaucrat is altered to
include the utility of city residents or other actors. Another alternative is to maintain the assumption of utility maximization of the
bureaucrat but to change other assumptions about his/her environment.
Two post-Niskanenian models are particularly attractive. First,
Miller and Moe (1983) have shown how different assumptions about
the role of legislative oversight and the representativeness of the
oversight committee can affect the output of a bureau managed by a
utility maximizing bureaucrat. They demonstrate that Niskanen's
model is a special case that relies on strong assumptions about oversight, representation, and strategic interactions.
Second, Dunleav/s (1991) "bureau-shaping" model is also promising. He assimies that rational and self-interested bureaucrats seek
to enhance the comfort of the bureau's position and environment.
Their ability to do so will depend on their rank in the hierarchy, the
bureau type, and the costs, benefits, and probability of achieving
personal goals. Niskanen's model is again a special case of this
model occurring only under extreme assumptions. This model is
broader and seems to explain a wider range of bureaucratic behavior.
One advantage of Niskanen's model, compared to the professionalism in government literature, is that it is a positive model with
clear predictions that can be applied to study the actions of government managers in the supply of public output. However, the authors
think that the emerging positive models are more promising than the
Niskanen model and need to be elaborated and tested.
In particular the authors suggest first, reformulation of the
bureaucrat's utility function so it can include non-pecuniary objectives such as the status and atmosphere of the work environment and
the bureaucrat's discretion. Second, varying the degree to which the
bureaucrat's utility function corresponds to that of his/her constituency may be fruitful. Third, the assumption that bureaus have
monopoly power and operate in a strictly hierarchical system should
be relaxed. Finally, the authors believe that assuming the bureaucrat
has a great deal of informational power over his/her political sponsor is not realistic; instead, the model should incorporate the costs
and benefits of information gathering for both parties. Bendor and
Hammond (1992) argue that future models of decision-making need
to take into account strategic interactions, including the information
available to the decision-maker. As Miller and Moe (1983) have
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shown, these modifications can be productively applied to models
like Niskanen's.
Testing the Niskanen model and the reform model is important
because they have shaped the ways many scholars think about
bureaucratic behavior and the supply of government output. Future
theoretical work should examine and expand upon the implications
for both models of changing assumptions about the information,
power, and representativeness of the actors. Future empirical research about contracting out and other privatization options should
test these modified versions of the Niskanen model and the reform
model to examine how professional managers differ from other officials in their consideration and use of alternative service delivery
options.

NOTES
1. The authors wish to thank the reviewers whose comments were very helpful as
well as Patricia Wallace Ingraham of Syracuse University, Wendy Wright, and Ron
Ketter of the State University of New York at Binghamton who provided helpful
comments on earlier versions of this article. All remaining shortcomings are our
own.
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